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Abstract: In the last decades; a growing stock of literature has been devoted to the 
criticism of GDP as an indicator of societal wealth. A relevant question is: what are the 
perspectives to build, on the existing knowledge and consensus, alternative measures 
of prosperity? A starting point may be to connect well-being research agenda with the 
sustainability one. However, there is no doubt that there is a lot of complexity and 
fuzziness inherent in multidimensional concepts such as sustainability and well-being.  
This article analyses the theoretical foundations and the empirical validity of some 
multidimensional technical tools that can be used for well-being evaluation and 
assessment. Of course one should not forget that policy conclusions derived through 
any mathematical model depend also on the conceptual framework used, i.e. which 
representation of reality (and thus which societal values and interests) has been 
considered. 
 
Key words: Well-Being, Sustainability, Multi-Criteria Evaluation, Composite Indicators, 
Complexity 
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1. Introduction 
The debate on the misuse of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as an indicator of societal 
wealth is almost as old as GDP itself (for a recent overview, see e.g. van den Bergh, 
2009). In recent years, a growing stock of literature has been written about concepts 
such as quality of life and well-being above all, after the influential Stiglitz, Sen and 
Fitoussi (2009) report which proposed the use of the concept of well-being as a proxy 
for measuring societal prosperity.  This debate has also invested the OECD and the 
European Commission, which devoted a number of recent conferences to the issue of 
well-being or happiness in the framework of the “Measuring Progress” framework.  
A relevant question is hence the following: what are the perspectives to build, on the 
existing knowledge and consensus, alternative measures of prosperity? A starting point 
may be to connect well-being research agenda with the sustainability one. This allows 
us to draw upon results already established in the literature and widely accepted by the 
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political and scientific communities; as stated by Arrow et al., (2012), “… Much of the 
literature on sustainable development has taken human wellbeing to be the object to be 
sustained.” One shared non-controversial result of the sustainability literature is that 
sustainability is a multidimensional concept, which should at least include economic, 
social, environmental and institutional dimensions. The next point to deal with is 
whether there is a multidimensional measurement framework able to cope with all 
these issues simultaneously.      
The objective of “green accounting” is to furnish information on the sustainability of the 
economy, but there is no established doctrine on how the different, and at times even 
contradictory, variables and indicators are to be combined so that they are made 
immediately useful for policy making in the same way that GDP or other 
macroeconomic statistics are (see e.g. Barbier and Markandya, 1990; Chichilnisky, 
1996; Faucheux and O’Connor, 1998; Funtowicz et al, 1999; Horwarth and Norgaard, 
1990, 1992; Musu and Siniscalco, 1996; Pearce et al., 1996). It is precisely the 
existence of multiple dimensions, along with that of their multiple interrelationships, that 
explains the difficult task of analysing sustainability. Taken as a whole, there is no 
generally accepted way of framing the analysis within which a study of sustainability 
should be performed.  
A point of scientific controversy present in the debate on sustainability measure is the 
use of monetary or physical indexes. Examples of monetary indexes are Daly and 
Cobb (1989) ISEW (Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare), the so-called El Serafy 
approach (Yusuf et al., 1989), Pearce and Atkinson (1993) Weak Sustainability Index 
and Genuine Savings (Atkinson and Hamilton, 2007). Examples of physical indexes 
are HANPP (Human Appropriation of Net Primary Production) (Vitousek et al, 1986), 
the Ecological Footprint (Wackernagel and Rees, 1995) and MIPS (Material Input Per 
unit of Service) (Schmidt-Bleek, 1994). Although these approaches may look different, 
they all have one common characteristic: 
1. These indexes are based on the hypothesis that a common measurement rod 
needs to be established for aggregation purposes (e.g. variables expressing 
money, energy, space, and so on). This creates the need to make very strong 
assumptions on conversion coefficients to be used and on the acceptable degree of 
compensability (e.g. until which point better economic performance may be justified 
at the expense of environmental destruction or social exclusion?). The 
mathematical aggregation convention behind an index thus needs an explicit and 
well-thought formulation. 
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2. These indexes are somewhat confusing if one wishes to derive policy suggestions. 
For example, by looking at ISEW, we could know that a country has a worse 
sustainability performance than the one pictured by the standard GDP, but so 
what? Since ISEW is so aggregated, it does not provide us with any clear 
information on the cause of this bad performance, and it is thus useless for policy-
making (while conventional GDP is at least giving some information on the 
economic performance). The same applies to the Ecological Footprint, which 
sometimes can even give misleading policy suggestions; for example, given that 
diet is used, it would imply that a more energy intensive agriculture might reduce 
the Ecological Footprint of e.g. a city, but in reality – if CO2 or energy consumption 
are factored in - its environmental performance would be much worse.  
3. All these approaches belong to the more general family of composite indicators and 
as a consequence, some assumptions used for their construction are common to 
them all. Notwithstanding the limits just mentioned, a conclusion that we can borrow 
from the sustainability literature is that composite indicators could be an adequate 
approach to measure overall performance regarding multidimensional concepts 
such as sustainability or well-being provided the temptation of a single metric is 
resisted. 
In the next Section, I will defend the idea that incommensurability, as a theoretical 
foundation, and multi-criteria analysis, as a possible practical framework, are the basic 
measurement principles for assessing multidimensional concepts such as well-being. 
In Section 3, sensitivity and uncertainty analysis is presented as an essential tool to 
increase the transparency of results and to help the framing of the debate around the 
use of a conceptual framework. Section 4 deals with the issue of how to implement 
well-being evidence based policy. Finally, in Section 5, some conclusions are drawn. 
 
2. Measuring Multidimensional Concepts 
2.1 Why? Complexity and the Incommensurability Principle 
The world is characterised by deep complexity. This obvious observation has important 
implications on the manner in which policy problems are represented and policy-
making is framed. To take any particular dimension as the true, real or total picture 
amounts to reductionism, whether physical or sociological (Giampietro et al, 2006). As 
a consequence, any attempt to fit the real world in a closed model leads to a 
simplification, which is violence to the description of reality. One should note that the 
construction of a descriptive model of a real-world system depends on very strong 
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assumptions about (1) the purpose of this construction, e.g. to evaluate well-being or 
sustainability (2) the scale of analysis, e.g. a city, a region or a country and (3) the set 
of dimensions, objectives and indicators used for the evaluation process. A reductionist 
approach for building a descriptive model can be defined as the use of just one 
measurable indicator (e.g. GDP per capita), one dimension (e.g. economic), one scale 
of analysis (e.g. region), one objective (e.g. the maximisation of economic efficiency) 
and one time horizon.  
 
The previous discussion can be summarized by using the philosophical concept of 
incommensurability (Chang, 1997; Rabinowicz, 2012). From a philosophical 
perspective, it is possible to distinguish between the concepts of strong comparability 
(there exists a single comparative term by which all different actions can be ranked) 
implying strong commensurability (a common measure of the various consequences of 
an action based on a cardinal scale of measurement) or weak commensurability (a 
common measure based on an ordinal scale of measurement),  and weak 
comparability (irreducible value conflict is unavoidable but compatible with rational 
choice employing, for example, multi-criteria evaluation) (Martinez-Alier et al., 1998; 
Munda, 2004; O'Neill, 1993). 
 
 In terms of formal logic, the difference between strong and weak comparability, and 
one defence of weak comparability, can be expressed in terms of Geach's distinction 
between attributive and predicative adjectives (Geach, 1956). In Geach’s own words: 
“There are familiar examples of what I call attributive adjectives. Big and small are 
attributive; x is a big flea does not split up into x is a flea and x is big, nor x is a small 
elephant into x is an elephant and x is small; for if these analyses were legitimate, a 
simple argument would show that a big flea is a big animal and a small elephant is a 
small animal. Again, the sort of adjective that the mediaevals called alienans is 
attributive; x is a forged banknote does not split up into x is a banknote and x is forged, 
nor x is the putative father of y into x is the father of y and x is putative. On the other 
hand, in the phrase a red book red is a predicative adjective in my sense, although not 
grammatically so, for is a red book logically splits up into is a book and is red.  
I can now state my first thesis about good and evil: good and bad are always 
attributive, not predicative, adjectives” (Geach, 1956, p. 32). 
 
Although Geach’s arguments were developed in the context of moral philosophy, they 
have an extraordinary explicative power for evaluation and assessment too. In fact, 
evaluation is all about an object a being declared better, worse or equal than another 
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object b. Now by developing further Geagh’s logic, it is possible to prove easily that 
strong comparability (and then commensurability) is a very weak theoretical foundation 
for evaluation tools, when multidimensionality is considered. In fact, now the question 
is: when commensurability is logically possible and correct? The distinction between 
attributive and predicative adjectives gives us a clear answer. 
 
Let us consider the basic example of apples and oranges, we all learn at primary 
school. Normally we are thought that we cannot sum up them unless we find a 
common unit of measurement, i.e. their price or the fact that they both belong to the set 
of fruit. In summary the search for commensurability always imply to look for a more 
general category (set) that can contain all the characteristics of the objects we wish to 
compare.  
Let us consider the following statements:  
a) "X is an old car, all cars are means of transport, and therefore X is an old mean of 
transport"; 
b) "X is a good car, all cars are means of transport, and therefore X is a good mean of 
transport "; 
 
I believe that everybody would agree on the validity of statement a), but very a few 
would accept statement b) as a correct way of reasoning. Being good or bad depends 
on the notion of quality used, which depends on the use connected to the object to be 
evaluated. For example, it is hard to defend that a car is a good mean of transport to 
travel inside a city’s historical centre.  This discussion can be generalised as follows: 
commensurability is correct only if the adjectives used are predicative ones. An 
adjective A is predicative if it passes the two following logical tests (Martinez-Alier et 
al., 1998): 
 (1) if x is AY, then x is A and x is Y; 
 (2) if x is AY and all Y's are Z's, then x is AZ. 
 
Adjectives that fail such tests are attributive. Geach claims that "good" is an attributive 
adjective. In many of its uses it clearly fails (2): "X is a good car, all cars are means of 
transport, and therefore X is a good mean of transport” is an invalid argument.  
 
At this point a question arises: is then the search for the “common rod of measurement” 
(such as money, energy or space) a non-sense? The answer is simple: one 
measurement rod makes sense if it is connected with one objective only; if a multiplicity 
of objectives has to be considered, to compress all dimensions into only one is fully 
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wrong.  For example, money values are worth to be used if they are connected to one 
objective and one institution only, i.e. economic efficiency and markets. They fail to 
incorporate other objectives and values. The same argument applies to e.g. ecological 
footprint measures that fail to consider economic scarcity and human preferences 
obviously. The economic value is different from e.g. ethical, environmental or artistic-
cultural values.  
 
A gastronomic example may clarify this issue. In choosing my diet I can decide that my 
objective is to minimise the content of calories and of course I can use Kcal as a 
common measurement rod correctly. If other objectives are considered too, e.g. to 
maximise taste or to minimise cost, the reductionism of using Kcal only is not 
consistent with the existence of two or three different objectives. In conclusion, weak 
comparability implies incommensurability i.e. there is an irreducible value conflict when 
deciding what common comparative term should be used to rank alternative actions. It 
is in terms of such descriptions that well-being evaluation and assessment takes place. 
According to Stiglitz, Sen and Fitoussi (2009, pp. 14, 15) “To define what well-being 
means a multidimensional definition has to be used. Based on academic research and 
a number of concrete initiatives developed around the world, the Commission has 
identified the following key dimensions that should be taken into account. At least in 
principle, these dimensions should be considered simultaneously: 
i. Material living standards (income, consumption and wealth); 
ii. Health; 
iii. Education; 
iv. Personal activities including work 
v. Political voice and governance; 
vi. Social connections and relationships; 
vii. Environment (present and future conditions); 
viii. Insecurity, of an economic as well as a physical nature.” 
 
In a multidimensional framework, a country is not evaluated as good or bad as such, 
but rather, in relation to different descriptions. A country could have, at one and the 
same time, a "good income" and a "bad environment", a "high level of health" and a 
"bad governance". The use of these value terms in such contexts is attributive, not 
predicative.  
 
The basic idea of multi-criteria evaluation is that in evaluation problems, we have first 
to establish objectives, i.e. the direction of the desired changes of the world (e.g. 
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maximise economic performance, minimise environmental impact, minimise social 
exclusion, etc.) and then find useful practical indicators (called criteria) which measure 
if the options considered are consistent with the objectives chosen (Figueira et al., 
2005; Munda, 2008; Nijkamp et al, 1990; Roy, 1996). Since in general, objectives are 
in conflict, multi-criteria mathematical aggregation rules look for so-called compromise 
solutions. In summary, incommensurability does not imply incomparability; on the 
contrary incommensurability is the only rational way to compare various objects under 
different methodological assumptions than maximisation or optimisation (Arrow, 1997; 
Sen, 1997; 2000; Sen and Williams, 1982). Weak comparability can be implemented by 
using multi-criteria evaluation. 
 
The discrete multi-criterion problem can be described in the following way: A is a finite 
set of N feasible actions (or alternatives); M is the number of different points of view or 
evaluation criteria gm  m=1, 2, ... , M considered relevant in a policy problem, where 
the action a is evaluated to be better than action b (both belonging to the set A) 
according to the m-th point of view if gm(a)>gm(b), W is a set of criterion weights   
W={wm} ,m=1,2,..., M,  with 


M
m
mw
1
1 , which can be importance coefficients or 
trade-offs. It is evident that the discrete multicriterion problem and the aggregation of 
individual indicators to build a composite are completely equivalent problems. In 
synthesis, the information contained in the impact matrix is: 
 Intensity of preference (when quantitative criterion/indicator scores are present). 
 Number of criteria/individual indicators in favour of a given object (country, region, city, 
etc.) to be ranked. 
 Weight attached to each single criterion/individual indicator. 
 Relationship (i.e. relative ordering) of each single object with all the other objects to be 
ranked. 
 
Combinations of this information generate different aggregation conventions, i.e. 
mathematical manipulation rules of the available information to arrive at a preference 
structure generating a ranking. The aggregation of several criteria/individual indicators 
implies taking a position on the fundamental issue of compensability. Compensability 
refers to the existence of trade-offs, i.e. the possibility of offsetting a disadvantage on 
some indicators by a sufficiently large advantage on another indicator, whereas smaller 
advantages would not do the same. Thus a preference relation is non-compensatory if 
no trade-off occurs and is compensatory otherwise. The use of weights with intensity of 
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preference originates compensatory aggregation methods and gives the meaning of 
trade-offs to the weights. On the contrary, the use of weights with ordinal indicator 
scores originates non-compensatory aggregation procedures and gives the weights the 
meaning of importance coefficients (Bouyssou and Vansnick, 1986; Keeney and Raiffa, 
1976; Podinovskii, 1994; Roberts, 1979).  
 
2.2 How? Mathematical Aggregation Rules 
The proliferation of composite indicators in recent decades is a clear symptom of the 
increasing quantification of policy-making (see e.g. Saltelli 2007) (the so-called 
evidence based policy) and their operational relevance in economic, social and 
environmental statistics in general (see Banerjee 2005, Cherchye  et al. 2007, Cox and 
others 1992, Cribari-Neto et al 1999, Griliches 1990, Lovell et al. 1995, McGuckin et al. 
2007, Srinivasan 2004, Williams and Siddique 2008 and Wilson and Jones 2002, 
among others). All the major international organizations, such as the OECD, the EU, 
the World Economic Forum, and the International Monetary Fund, are producing 
composite indicators in a wide variety of fields (Nardo et al., 2008).  
 
From a formal point of view, a composite indicator is an aggregate of all dimensions, 
objectives, individual indicators and variables used for its construction (Munda and 
Nardo, 2009). This implies that what defines a composite indicator is the set of 
properties underlying its mathematical aggregation convention.  Although various 
functional forms for the underlying aggregation rules of a composite indicator have 
been developed in the literature, in the standard practice, a composite indicator is very 
often constructed by using a weighted linear aggregation rule applied to a set of 
variables. Let us then check which axiomatic conditions govern the applicability of a 
linear aggregation rule; an essential condition is mutual preferential independence. On 
this respect, the following theorem holds:  
 
Theorem 1: Given the set of individual indicators G, a subset of indicators Y is 
preferentially independent of Yc=Q (the complement of Y) only if any conditional 
preference among elements of Y, holding all elements of Q fixed, remain the same, 
regardless of the levels at which Q are held. The indicators g1, g2,..., gm are mutually 
preferentially independent if every subset Y of these indicators is preferentially 
independent of its complementary set of indicators. (Ting, 1971). This means that an 
additive aggregation function permits the assessment of the marginal contribution of 
each indicator separately (as a consequence of the preferential independence 
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condition). The marginal contribution of each indicator can then be added together to 
yield a total score.  
 
One should note that in operational terms preference independence implies that in 
constructing a well-being composite indicator, we have to assume that individual 
indicators such as GDP and urban waste or unemployment rate have no relationship or 
if environmental dimensions are involved, the use of a linear aggregation function 
implies that among the different aspects of an ecosystem there are not phenomena of 
synergy or conflict. Summarising, we may conclude that the assumption of preferential 
independence is essential for the application of a linear aggregation rule. Unfortunately, 
it is rarely tested whether preferential independence applies to a given set of indicators 
prior to aggregating the indicators into a composite indicator, although this assumption 
has very strong consequences on the results and their interpretation.   
 
Let us now look at another important implication of the use of linear aggregation rule, 
i.e. the meaning of weights. The common practice in constructing composite indicators 
is well synthesised in an OECD report, where it is clearly stated: “Greater weight 
should be given to components which are considered to be more significant in the 
context of the particular composite indicator” (OECD, 2003, p. 10). This concept of 
weights, from a theoretical point of view, could be related to the symmetrical 
importance, that is “… if we have two non-equal numbers to construct a vector in 2R , 
then it is preferable to place the greatest number in the position corresponding to the 
most important criterion.” (Podinovskii, 1994, p. 241).  
 
Let us further explain how the concept of symmetrical importance is related to the 
linear aggregation rule. Suppose that country a is evaluated according to some 
indicators values ))(),...,(( 1 axax m . Then the substitution rate at a, of the value jx  with 
respect to the value rx  (taken as a reference) is the amount ( )jrS a  such that, country 
b whose evaluations are: ( ) ( ), ,l lx a x b l j r   ; ( ) ( ) 1j jx b x a  ; and 
( ) ( ) ( )r r jrx b x a S a   is indifferent to country a.  Therefore, ( )jrS a  is the amount which 
must be added to the value )(axr  (reference) in order to compensate the loss of one 
unit on value )(ax j . Consider now a composite indicator ),...,,( 21 mxxxY and suppose 
that two countries have equal composite indicator scores. Let 
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))(),...,(),(()( 21 axaxaxaz m  and ))(),...,(),(()( 21 bxbxbxbz m , then as a first 
approximation one has:  
 
aaa z
r
jr
zj
m
i ii
zi
ab x
YaS
x
Yaxbx
x
YzYzY 














   )()()()()(0 1  
which is equivalent to    
a
a
zr
zj
jr
x
Y
x
Y
aS












)(     (1) 
     
When the function Y is a weighted average of normalised indicators, i.e. 
 
  mi iim xwxxxY 121 ),...,,(  (2) 
 
then from expression (2) one obtains: 
 
.)( const
w
w
aS
r
j
jr   (3) 
 
As a consequence, substitution rates are directly estimated by the weights (Vincke, 
1992). This implies a compensatory logic. ‘Compensability’ here refers to the existence 
of trade-offs, i.e. the possibility of offsetting very low values on several indicators by 
very high values on just few indicators. Therefore, the use of weights in combination 
with intensity of preference within a linear aggregation rule originates compensatory 
aggregation conventions and gives the meaning of trade-offs to the weights. 
Consequently, there exists an inconsistency between the way weights are used in 
practice and their theoretical meaning. If weights are to be interpreted as ‘importance 
coefficients’ (along the lines of ‘symmetrical importance’ of indicators, e.g. place the 
greatest weight to the most important dimension) then non-compensatory aggregation 
rules are more appropriate for the construction of composite indicators (Roberts, 1979; 
Bouyssou, 1986; Bouyssou and Vansnick, 1986; Vansnick, 1986).  
 
We may then conclude that the use of non-linear/non-compensatory aggregation rules 
to construct composite indicators is compulsory for reasons of theoretical consistency 
when weights with the meaning of importance coefficients are used or when the 
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assumption of preferential independence does not hold. Moreover, in standard linear 
composite indicators, compensability among the different individual indicators is always 
assumed; this implies complete substitutability among the various components 
considered. For example, in a hypothetical sustainability index, economic growth can 
always substitute any environmental destruction or inside e.g., the environmental 
dimension, clean air can compensate for a loss of potable water. From a normative 
point of view, such a complete compensability might not be desirable (Markandya and   
Pedroso-Galinato, 2007, Munda, 1997). A search for alternative mathematical 
aggregation rules is then needed.   
 
Vansnick (1990) showed that the two main approaches in multi-criteria decision theory 
i.e., the compensatory and non-compensatory ones can be directly derived from the 
seminal work of Borda (1784) and Condorcet (1785). The debate on the relative merits 
of Borda and Condorcet consistent voting rules is a very old one. Indeed according to 
McLean (1990), these rules were already known in the medieval age, when Ramon Lull 
(1235-1315) proposed a Condorcet method and Nicolaus Cusanus (1401-1464) 
proposed a Borda method.  In 1986 Kenneth Arrow and Hervé Raynaud published a 
very influential book titled “Social choice and multicriterion decision-making”, where the 
formal analogies between the discrete multi-criterion problem and the social choice one 
are deeply analyzed. This book is based on the assumption that, in the case where all 
criteria have ordinal impact scores, if one considers the evaluation criteria as voters, a 
multi-criteria impact matrix and a voting matrix are identical. As a consequence all 
results of social choice also apply to multi-criteria decision theory fully (when no 
intensity of preference is used) and then to the construction of composite indicators 
too.   
 
A first topic to start with is Arrow’s impossibility theorem (Arrow, 1963). A legitimate 
question arises: does this paradoxical result apply to the general discrete aggregation 
problem too? Arrow and Raynaud (1986, pp. 17-23) answer this question. Let us 
assume that a mathematical aggregation convention to arrive at a total ranking of all 
objects needs at least to satisfy three axioms1:  
Axiom 1: Unrestricted Domain. The values that can be taken by the indicators are 
unrestricted and the mathematical aggregation convention must respect unanimity. 
                                                
1 The original Arrow’s impossibility theorem (Arrow, 1963) is slightly different, above all with respect to the independence 
of irrelevant alternatives axiom. In the social choice literature formulation, it is called the axiom of binary independence, 
i.e. the social ranking of each pair of alternatives depends only on the preferences of each voter on that specific pair of 
alternatives. The ranking of any other alternative is irrelevant for this social ranking. Indeed in the version proposed by 
Arrow and Raynaud (1986) the axiom of independence of irrelevant alternatives is closer to the definition given by 
Chernoff (1954), which is derived from Nash’s bargaining theory. For a deep discussion on the independence of 
irrelevant alternatives axiom and its various definitions see e.g. Ray (1973) and Bordes and Tideman (1991).  
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Axiom 2: Independence of irrelevant alternatives. The ranking of the objects 
(alternatives) in A depends only on the objects (alternatives) belonging to A. “This 
means that it is of no importance for the decision if you have forgotten in the application 
of the method some (poorly ranked) alternatives: …. The complete set of alternatives is 
always very large and only a relatively small subset can be identified. It is thus 
essential that the result of the method on a small set of alternatives not vary if forgotten 
alternatives are taken into consideration” (Arrow and Raynaud, 1986, p. 19). 
Axiom 3: Positive Responsiveness.  The degree of preference between two objects a 
and b is a strictly increasing function of the number of indicators (or weights) that rank 
a before b.  
 
The following paradoxical result then applies: the only ranking respecting all these 
axioms must coincide with the ranking supplied by one of the indicators taken into 
consideration. A consequence of this theorem is that no perfect mathematical 
aggregation convention can exist. “Reasonable” ranking procedures must then be 
found. In the framework of composite indicators, this consequence implies two 
questions: Is it possible to find a ranking algorithm consistent with a set of desirable 
properties2 ? And on the reverse, is it possible to assure that no essential property is 
lost? At this point, the question arises: in the framework of composite indicators, can 
we choose between Borda scoring methods and Condorcet consistent aggregation 
rules on some theoretical and/or practical grounds?  
 
The following conclusions can be drawn (see Munda, 2012a). Scoring methods present 
the advantage of always selecting one final solution thus their degree of decisiveness 
is very high. However, one has to accept that a scoring method always implies to 
transform (arbitrarily) an original ordinal scale of measurement into a quantitative one, 
and this implies to always have a compensatory aggregation rule. Compensability, 
which is based on the concept of intensity of preference, causes a high probability of 
preference reversal phenomena. Weights should always be in the form of trade-offs. 
Monotonicity sometimes is lost and neutrality can be relaxed. A strong argument in 
favour of a Borda scoring rule is that transitivity of the preference relation is never 
weakened, thus the assumption of individual rationality always applies. 
                                                
2 Often this search for clear properties characterizing an algorithm is indicated as the axiomatic approach. However, one 
should note that properties or assumptions are NOT axioms. As perfectly synthesized by Saari (2006, p. 110) “Many, if 
not most, results in this area are merely properties that happen to uniquely identify a particular procedure. But unless 
these properties can be used to construct, or be identified with all properties of the procedure (such as in the 
development of utility functions in the individual choice literature), they are not building blocks and they most surely are 
not axioms: they are properties that just happen to identify but not characterize, a procedure. As an example, the two 
properties (1) Finnish-American heritage (2) a particular DNA structure, uniquely identify me, but they most surely do not 
characterize me”. 
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Condorcet consistent rules are adequate for finding rankings of objects. They present a 
lower probability of rank reversal than any scoring method. They are not compensatory 
thus weights can be treated as importance coefficients. A weak point is the high 
probability of presence of cycles; their solution normally implies ad hoc rules of thumb, 
this problem can be solved by means of the so-called Condorcet (1785), Kemeny 
(1959), Young and Levenglick (1978) (CKYL) ranking procedure. In the framework of 
composite indicators, sometimes compensability should be limited and rankings should 
be supplied; furthermore, transitivity relation can be weakened and neutrality should in 
principle always be kept. Scoring methods are then, sometimes less adequate than 
Condorcet based approaches to rank feasible objects.  
 
I offer next a hand-waiving description of a non-compensatory multi-criteria algorithm 
(for details and formal proofs see Munda and Nardo, 2009 and Munda, 2012a). Given a 
set of individual indicators  mgG  , Mm ,...,2,1 and a finite set  naA  , 
Nn ,...,2,1 of countries, let us assume that the performance of a country na  with 
respect to an indicator mg  is measured on an interval or ratio scale and that a higher 
value is preferred to a lower value. Then, a comparison between two countries could 
either be described by: 
 

 

)()(
)()(
kmjmkj
kmjmkj
agagIaa
agagPaa
                                                                 (4) 
 
where P  and I indicate a preference and an indifference relation respectively. Both 
relations have a transitive property. Let us also assume that weights, iw , with the 
meaning of importance coefficients are assigned to the indicators. The question is how 
to use the available information on indicators and weights to rank in a complete pre-
order (i.e. without any incomparability relation) all the countries from the best to the 
worst one. The mathematical aggregation convention can be divided into two main 
steps: 
1. pair-wise comparison of countries using the entire set of indicators, 
2. ranking of countries in a complete pre-order.  
 
In Step 1, an NN  matrix, E , called ‘outranking matrix’ can be built (Arrow and 
Raynaud, 1986; Roy, 1996). An element kje jk , of the outranking matrix summarises 
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the result of all pair-wise comparisons between countries j and k across 
theM individual indicators, and it is given by: 
 
1
1( ) ( )
2
M
jk m mjk jk
m
P Ie w w

             (5) 
 
where jkP  and jkI are binary variables representing a preference or indifference 
relation and are calculated by: 


otherwise
Paaif
P kjjk ,0
,1
  
and 


otherwise
Iaaif
I kjjk ,0
,1
                                                                                              (6) 
 
It then holds that 
1 kjjk ee      (7) 
 
For Step 2, there are several ranking procedures. The so-called Condorcet-Kemeny-
Young-Levenglick (CKYL) ranking procedure can be described as follows. According to 
CKYL, the ranking of countries with the highest likelihood is the one supported by the 
maximum number of indicators for each pair-wise comparison, summed over all pairs 
of countries considered. In practice, call R  the set of all !N possible complete rankings 
of the countries,   !,...,2,1, NsrR s   For each sr  compute the corresponding score 
 s as the summation of jke over all the 



2
N
 pairs kj, of alternatives, i.e.  
 jks e        
(8) 
 
where !,...,2,1, Nskj   and sjk re  . 
The final ranking ( *r ) is the one which maximises Equation (9), which is:  
 
Rewhereer jkjk   max* .   (9) 
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Let us take into consideration a simple hypothetical example with three countries (A, B, 
C) to be ranked according to a composite indicator. Let us assume that three 
dimensions have to be considered, i.e. economic, social and environmental, and that 
each dimension should have the same weight, i.e. 0.3333.  
 
The following individual indicators are used: 
Economic dimension 
Indicator: GDP per capita. Weight: 0.167. Objective: maximization of economic growth. 
Variable: US dollar per year. 
Indicator: Unemployment rate. Weight: 0.167. Objective: minimization of unemployed 
people. Variable: percentage of population. 
Environmental dimension 
Indicator: Solid waste generated per capita. Weight: 0.333. Objective: minimization of 
environmental impact. Variable: tons per year. 
Social dimension 
Indicator: Income disparity. Weight: 0.167. Objective: minimization of distributional 
inequity. Variable: Q5/Q1. 
Indicator: Crime rate. Weight: 0.167. Objective: minimization of criminality. Variable: 
robberies per 1000 inhabitants. 
 
The impact matrix described in Table 1 can then be constructed. 
 
 Indicators GDP Unemp.
rate 
Solid 
waste
Inc. 
dispar.
Crime
rate 
Countries       
A  22,000 0.17 0.4 10.5 40 
B  45,000 0.09 0,45 11.0 45 
C  20,000 0.08 0.35 5.3 80 
 
Table 1 Impact Matrix of the Illustrative Numerical Example 
 
 
The pair-wise comparison results can be summarized in the following outranking 
matrix: 
0 0.666 0.333
0.333 0 0.333
0.666 0.666 0
A B C
A
E
B
C
       
 
 
By applying the C-K-Y-L rule to the 3! possible rankings we obtain: 
  
Page 16 of 32 
  
 
ABC 1 0.666 + 0.333 + 0.333 = 1.333 
BCA  2 0.333 + 0.333 + 0.666 = 1.333 
CAB 3 0.666 + 0.666 + 0.666 = 2 
ACB  4 0.333 + 0.666 + 0.666 = 1.666 
BAC 5 0.333 + 0.333 + 0.333 = 1 
CBA 6 0.666 + 0.666 + 0.333 = 1.666 
The final ranking r* is then CAB.  
 
Note that using one of the standard ways to produce a composite indicator would 
produce a different result. Let us look at a real-world example: the "Environmental 
Sustainability Index" (ESI). The index for 2005 was produced by a team of 
environmental researchers from Yale and Columbia Universities, in co-operation with 
the World Economic Forum and the Joint Research Centre of the European 
Commission. The aim of the ESI 2005 was to benchmark the ability of 146 nations to 
protect the environment over the next decades, by integrating 76 data sets into 21 
indicators of environmental sustainability (see Esty at al., 2005). The database used to 
construct the ESI covers a wide range of aspects of environmental sustainability 
ranging from the physical state and stress of the environmental systems (like natural 
resource depletion, pollution, ecosystem destruction) to the more general social and 
institutional capacity to respond to environmental challenges. Poverty, short-term 
thinking and lack of investment in capacity and infrastructure committed to pollution 
control and ecosystem protection thus compete to determine the measure of a 
country’s sustainability. 
 
Although the official ESI ranking is based upon the linear aggregation of 21 equally 
weighted indicators, an attempt has been made, in the methodological appendix, to 
apply the non-compensatory approach presented here, in order to tackle the issues of 
weights as “importance measure” and the compensability of different and crucial 
dimension of environmental sustainability (see the Methodological Appendix in Esty et 
al., 2005).  It is important to underline that although both aggregation schemes seem to 
produce consistent rankings those rankings do not nevertheless coincide. Using the 
non-compensatory approach, 43 out of 146 countries experience a change in rank 
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greater than ten positions (none before the 30th ESI rank). When compensability 
among indicators is not allowed, countries with very poor performance in some 
indicators, such as Indonesia or Armenia, worsen their rank with respect to the linear 
yardstick, whereas countries that have less extreme values improve their ranking, such 
as Azerbaijan or Spain. Table 2 shows the countries with the largest variation in their 
ranks. 
 
  Aggregation ESI 
rank 
with 
LIN 
rank 
with 
NCMC 
Change 
in Rank
Im
pr
ov
em
en
t
Azerbaijan  99 61 38 
Spain  76 45 31 
Nigeria  98 69 29 
South Africa  93 68 25 
Burundi  130 107 23 
D
et
er
io
ra
tio
n
Indonesia  75 114 39 
Armenia  44 79 35 
Ecuador  51 78 27 
Turkey  91 115 24 
Sri Lanka  79 101 22 
Average change over 146 countries 8 
 
Table 2 ESI Rankings Obtained by Linear Aggregation (LIN) and the C-K-Y-L Ranking 
Procedure: Countries That Greatly Improve or Greatly Worsen Their Rank Position 
 
To give another example, we may consider results obtained by Munda and Saisana 
(2011), who considered a theoretical framework for measuring regional sustainability 
based on the three main dimensions - environment, society, economy- and has been 
based on 29 indicators applied to Spanish regions and selected Greek and Italian 
regions. Figure 1 plots the non-compensatory/non-linear multi-criteria ranks versus 
those of the linear aggregation. This graph allows one to see immediately which 
regions are compensating their deficiencies in some indicators with a relatively good 
performance in other indicators under a linear/compensatory logic. All those regions 
are found at the bottom-right part of Figure 1, e.g. Attiki, Kriti, Extremadura and 
Thessalia. Another apparent feature is that the aggregation method primarily affects 
the middle rank regions and, to a lesser extent, the most or least sustainable regions. 
The two aggregation approaches have a Spearman correlation coefficient r = 0.643.  
 
In conclusion, by means of the C-K-Y-L approach non-compensability can be 
implemented and cycles can be tackled in a general way with no arbitrariness.  A 
criticism often made to this approach is that non-compensability implies the analytical 
cost of loosing all available information about intensity of preference, i.e. if some 
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variables are measured on interval or ratio scales, they have to be treated as 
measured on an ordinal scale. Indeed this criticism is not entirely correct; in fact it is 
possible to model e.g. degrees of credibility of preference and indifference ralations 
inside a non-compensatory framework by means of sensibility thresholds (Luce, 1956). 
To give a simple example, by introducing a positive constant indifference threshold q 
the resulting preference model is the threshold model where aj and ak belong to the set 
A of alternatives and gm to the set G of evaluation indicators. 
 







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qagagaIa
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      (10) 
 
 
A survey of mathematical characterisations of preference modelling with thresholds 
and an advance the state of the art can be found in Munda (2012b). 
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Figure 1 Non-Compensatory Multi-Criteria Aggregation (MCA) of Indicators versus  
Linear Aggregation of Indicators  
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However, an important problem to be solved is the computation of the C-K-Y-L ranking 
scores when many countries are present. One should note that the number of 
permutations can easily become unmanageable; for example it is 10!=3,628,800. 
Moulin (1988, p. 312) clearly states that the Kemeny method (that I call the C-K-Y-L 
approach) is “the correct method” for ranking objects, and that the “only drawback of 
this aggregation method is the difficulty in computing it when the number of candidates 
grows”. Indeed this computational drawback is very serious since the Kemeny median 
order is NP-hard to compute3. This NP-hardness has discouraged the development of 
algorithms searching for exact solutions; thus the majority of algorithms useful in the 
framework of composite indicators are heuristics based on artificial intelligence, branch 
and bound approaches and multi-stage techniques (see e.g., Barthelemy et al., 1989; 
Charon et al., 1997; Cohen et al., 1999).   
 
3. Uncertainty and Sensitivity Analysis 
The current rise in the number and influence of composite indicators in public policy 
calls for a systematic investigation into their intrinsic accuracy and reliability. In fact 
composite indicators may also present a number of risks, such as oversimplification, 
wrong policy conclusions due to model misspecification, and biased results caused by 
hidden subjective judgments in the design process (Saltelli, 2007). Uncertainty and 
sensitivity analysis can help to gauge the robustness of the composite indicator, to 
increase its transparency and to help frame a debate around it (Jamison and Sandbu, 
2001; Kratena and Streicher 2012; Maasoumi and Yalonetzky, 2013; Munda and 
Saisana, 2011; Paruolo et al, forthcoming; Saisana et al., 2005; Saltelli et al., 2000, 
2008).  Uncertainty analysis focuses on how the sources of uncertainty propagate 
through the structure of the composite indicator and affect its values.  Sensitivity 
analysis studies how much each individual source of uncertainty contributes to the 
composite indicator value/ranking variance. The types of questions for which an 
answer is sought via the application of these techniques are:  
 Does the use of one construction strategy versus another in building the 
composite indicator actually provide a partial picture of the countries’ 
performance?  
 Which countries have large uncertainty bounds in their rank (volatile countries)? 
 Which are the factors that affect the countries rankings? 
                                                
3 The complexity class of decision problems that are intrinsically harder than those that can be solved by a 
nondeterministic Turing machine in polynomial time. When a decision version of a combinatorial optimization 
problem is proved to belong to the class of NP-complete problems, then the optimization version is NP-hard (definition 
given by the National Institute of Standards and Technology, http://www.nist.gov/dads/HTML/nphard.html ). 
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A plurality of methods (all with their implications) should be initially considered, 
because no model (composite indicator construction strategy) is a priori better than 
another, provided that internal coherence is always assured, as each model serves 
different interests. The composite indicator is no longer a magic number corresponding 
to crisp data treatment, weighting set or aggregation method, but reflects uncertainty 
and ambiguity in a more transparent and defensible fashion (Munda, 2008; Nardo et al, 
2008). 
 
In summary, results obtained by using a composite indicator always depend heavily on 
the problem’s structuring phase. In general main delicate issues are (Munda, 2005): 
(1) Mathematical aggregation rule used.  This issue has been examined in the previous 
Section. 
(2) Quality of the information available. One should note that even if a data base has 
been submitted to rigorous quality check, from a pure technical point of view, the 
following uncertainty sources are always present and have to be taken into account 
(Nardo et al., 2008): 
 the consideration of measurement error in the data,  
 the imputation of missing data,  
 the treatment of outliers and extreme values,  
 the transformation of skewed indicators,  
 the standardization/normalization of the data (e.g., re-scaling, standardisation). 
 
(3) Indicators chosen i.e. which representation of reality we are using. A set of 
indicators is not the reality, but it is simply a descriptive model of it. It is important then 
to check the relevance and the explicative capacity of the theoretical framework used. 
The way one may choose to deal with this issue is by looking at the sensitivity of 
results to the exclusion/inclusion of different individual indicators and dimensions. 
Although, this analysis may look very technical in nature, in reality a social component 
is also present. In fact to consider or not a given dimension, normally has behind a long 
story of social, political and scientific controversy (Munda, 2008). To give an example, 
the environmental dimension nowadays is considered very important in almost any 
analysis; however this was not true 40 years ago, mainly because the social concerns 
on the environment in the past were very limited. As a conclusion, we should 
remember that to include or exclude a given dimension or a set of indicators means to 
deal or not with peculiar social concerns and social actors. 
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(4)Weighting of the indicators e.g., equal weighting, factor analysis, expert opinion and 
so on. This again has a technical and a more socio-political component. The following 
weighting assumptions may have a general validity: 
(1) equal weights to individual indicators (thus dimensions weight is determined by the 
total number of individual indicators per dimension), 
(2) equal weights to the various dimensions (thus weights to individual indicators vary 
according to their number per dimension) (Munda, 2008), 
(3) Factor analysis (The indicators (z-scores) are weighted and aggregated into sub-
dimensions using factor analysis (Nardo et al., 2008).  
(4) Endogenous weights derived by data envelopment analysis. These weights allow to 
check how stable is a bottom position of a country – since the best set of weights for 
that country is used – and then to derive policy priority (Cherchye et al., 2004).  
 
To look at an example, we may continue the ESI example seen in the previous Section 
and ask: what are the largest factors influencing results of the 2005 ESI? To answer 
this question, one may focus on the following comparisons (see the Methodological 
Appendix in Esty et al., 2005): 
1. Imputation versus no imputation 
2. Expert-weighting versus equal weighting of the 21 indicators 
3. Aggregation at the dimensions level versus at the indicators level 
4. Non-compensatory aggregation scheme versus linear aggregation 
 
Imputation 
Imputation should be more influential for countries where missing data are a large 
problem, although this relationship does not seem to be straightforward. Among the 
countries that miss almost 33% of their observations, only Guinea-Bissau and 
Myanmar are strongly affected by the imputations. Without imputation, Syria, Algeria, 
Belgium and the Dominican Republic improve their ranks between 29 and 37 positions. 
Conversely, Mali, Guinea-Bissau, Myanmar, and Zambia, decline 27 to 43 positions. 
Overall, the imputation has an average impact of 10 ranks and a rank-order correlation 
coefficient of 0.949. 
 
Expert weighting versus equal weighting  
The ESI 2005 used equal weights to calculate the country scores from 21 indicators. 
As alternative weighting schemes a “budget allocation scheme,” was tested in which 
the weights are obtained from experts with a demonstrated understanding of 
environmental sustainability. Seventeen experts were each given a “budget” of 100 
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points and asked to allocate them to the 21 indicators according to their personal 
judgment of the relative importance of the indicators. The average expert weighting is 
slightly different from the equal weighting used in the ESI, nevertheless, the variance of 
experts’ opinions is rather large, varying from 40-80% of the mean weight. This 
explains the difference between the ESI ranking and the one obtained when using the 
average expert weighting set. Overall, the weighting has an average impact of 5 ranks 
in the simulations and a rank-order correlation coefficient of 0.989. 
 
Aggregation at the Dimension Level v. Aggregation at the Indicators Level 
In order to further assess the robustness of the ESI, it was analysed the possibility of 
equally weighting the five dimensions: Environmental Systems, Reducing 
Environmental Stresses, Human Vulnerability, Social and Institutional Capacity, and 
Global Stewardship, instead of the 21 indicators. It was found that by changing the 
aggregation level, the average shift of the top 40 and the bottom 30 countries of the 
ESI 2005 is 7 positions and the shift of the remaining countries averages 11 positions. 
The average impact is 8 ranks and the rank-order correlation coefficient remains very 
high at 0.964.  
 
Aggregation rule and the compensation issue 
The aggregation rule matters mainly for the mid-performing countries. When the 
assumption of compensability among indicators is removed, countries having very poor 
performance in some indicators, such as Indonesia or Armenia, decline in rank, 
whereas countries with fewer extreme values, such as Azerbaijan or Spain, improve 
their position. Overall, the aggregation rule has an average impact of 8 ranks. 
 
As one can see, sensitivity analysis helps to gauge the robustness of the results 
obtained, to increase the transparency of the ranking system, to identify how countries 
or regions that improve or decline under certain assumptions, and to help the framing 
of the debate around the use of a conceptual framework. Unfortunately, most 
practitioners compute a composite indicator by a simple weighted summation 
mathematical model; sometimes it is acknowledged that the ranking obtained is subject 
to some uncertainty, but this issue is treated as a kind of mathematical appendix for 
technical readers, and all policy suggestions are derived under the assumption of the 
linear aggregation model.  
 
Saisana and Munda (2008) believe that to deal with the criticism that rankings are 
presented as they were under conditions of certainty, while it is well known that this is 
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not true, it is a key issue for the use of composite indicators in the policy arena. 
Saisana and Munda (2008) make a simple methodological proposal, i.e. let us consider 
as the final composite indicator the frequency of all rankings obtained by means of all 
the simulations carried out by considering the combinations of all the possible 
methodological assumptions relevant for the construction of a real-world composite 
indicator. In this way, the ranking presented is the one derived by considering the 
whole spectrum of uncertainty. The objective is to synthesize and make explicit the 
uncertainty contained in the rankings. For each country it is indicated the percentage of 
times it was in a given rank in all the simulations, thus presenting a clear measurement 
of the degree of uncertainty contained in the ranking obtained. In summary, all possible 
technical uncertainties are simulated and then aggregated by using a simple social 
choice aggregation rule, i.e. a Borda scoring method.  
 
To give a simple illustrative example, let us consider a composite for the knowledge 
economy, called KEI (Saisana and Munda (2008)). In the KEI original conceptual 
framework of the knowledge economy, a total of 115 individual indicators were 
selected. The proposed multi-modelling approach was applied to weight and further 
aggregate the sub-dimensions scores into dimensions and finally into a composite 
indicator (see Table 3). The computations consisted of about 2,000 simulations 
(saturated sampling) based on combinations of the: 
1. imputation method (Missing data were imputed using two different approaches: 
splines or multiple imputation, 2 datasets were thus used in the analysis 
described next); 
2. number of sub-dimensions (all 29 sub-dimensions included or one-at-time 
excluded); 
3. number of dimensions (all seven dimensions included or one-at-time excluded); 
4. normalisation of the 29 sub-dimensions scores (z-scores or min-max); 
5. structure relating the sub-dimensions to the dimensions (preserved or not); 
6. weighting method (factor analysis, equal weighting, data envelopment analysis); 
7. aggregation rule (additive, multiplicative, non-compensatory multi-criteria 
analysis).    
 
The frequency matrix of a country’s rank in each of the seven dimensions and the 
overall KEI is calculated across the 2,000 scenarios is presented in Table 3.  The 
objective here is to synthesize and make explicit the uncertainty contained in the 
country ranking. For each country it is indicated the percentage of times it was in a 
given rank in all the 2,000 simulations, one can see that e.g. Poland was 100% of times 
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in the last position, and Sweden 54% of times in the first position and 46% in the 
second. In the example we are considering, overall we can state that the ranking is 
very stable; in fact considering the whole 2,000 simulations, all countries are clustered 
unambiguously.  No doubt the top performing countries are Sweden, Denmark 
Luxembourg, Finland and the USA. Then it follows the group Japan, United Kingdom, 
Netherlands and Ireland (where Japan and UK are slightly better than the other two). 
Austria, Belgium, France and Germany form the next group (where Germany is slightly 
worst than all the other three). All the rest of countries can be considered with a bad 
performance with respect to knowledge based economy.  
 
 
Table 3  Frequency matrix of the KEI composite country rankings 
 
 
4. Evidence Based Policy: Evaluation and Benchmarking 
At this stage a question may be raised:  is all this effort of any use? Even if we have a 
very reliable ranking, which is the utility, for policy-making, of knowing that a country is 
overall better than another one or vice versa? Let’s try to put some light on this issue. 
First of all, one should note that for the majority of indicators used in assessment 
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Sweden 54 46
Denmark 55 30 14
Luxembourg 36 4 14 25 4 7 7 4
Finland 18 23 29 9 11 11
USA 11 32 2 4 39 9 4
Japan 4 7 18 32 36 4
UK 2 5 16 38 39
Netherlands 86 4 4 7
Ireland 4 61 14 4 9 9
Austria 18 50 18 7 7
Belgium 11 4 11 57 16 2
France 4 14 18 11 54
EU15 4 57 39
EU25 4 4 14 32 39 7
Germany 7 79 4 7 4
Slovenia 7 41 38 14
Estonia 4 36 25 21 11 4
Malta 7 13 9 21 23 27
Cyprus 36 7 4 23 23 7
Spain 4 4 32 25 29 7
Czech. Rep. 4 7 30 39 5 7 7
Latvia 20 36 11 21 7 5
Italy 29 18 9 29 9 7
Greece 4 4 4 29 18 21 7 14
Lithuania 4 41 13 32 11
Hungary 2 13 13 57 2 14
Portugal 4 4 7 11 61 14
Slovakia 4 7 18 71
Poland 100
Legend:
Frequency lower 15%
Frequency between 15 and 30%
Frequency between 30 and 50%
Frequency greater than 50%
Knowledge Economy Index
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exercises no clear reference point is available, for instance, when GDP is used nobody 
knows the ideal value of a Country GDP, thus it is quite common to compare with other 
countries GDP, e.g. the USA one. In order to get a set of reference values, an “ideal 
point” can be defined by choosing the best values reached in any single indicator. This 
is a well established technique in multi-criteria evaluation literature (see e.g. Yu, 1985; 
Zeleny, 1982) and has the advantage of indicating real world ideal values. 
 
Briefly, the philosophy underlying the multi-criteria methods based on ideal point 
concepts can be summarized as follows: multidimensional evaluation problems are 
characterized by conflict because of the perceived absence of an obvious “best” option; 
therefore, the only way to resolve the conflict is to find or invent an ideal point. The only 
way to decrease the intensity of the conflict is to find or generate alternatives which are 
as close as possible to the ideal point. The ideal point procedures are characterized by 
the following axiom of choice: alternatives that are closer to the ideal are preferred to 
those that are farther away. To be as close as possible to the perceived ideal is the 
rationale of choice.  
 
One of the traditional ideal point approaches is to compute the mathematical distance 
of each action from the ideal point and then rank them in terms of their proximity to the 
ideal. Another possibility is the use of aspiration levels (or goals) which express the 
desired outcomes of a given policy in terms of a certain level to be aimed at for each 
objective. The usual way in which aspiration levels are treated is by means of goal 
programming (Spronk, 1981). An advantage of goal programming is that it always 
provides a solution, even if none of the goals are realizable, provided that the feasible 
region is non-empty. This is possible by using deviational variables, which show 
whether the goals have been attained or not. In the latter case, they measure the 
distance between the realized and aspired levels. An approach that can be viewed as a 
generalization of goal programming and ideal point techniques is the "achievement 
scalarizing functions" method (Wierzbicki, 1982).   
 
A first very simple mathematical procedure can be the application of a normalisation 
rule known as “distance from the group leader”, which assigns 100 to the leading 
country and other countries are ranked as percentage points away from the leader 
(Nardo et al., 2008). This technique can be considered a simple distance function.  For 
example by applying this technique to one of the Spanish regions analysed by Munda 
and Saisana (2011), the Basque Country, the following results visualised by a radar 
diagramme are obtained (see Figure 2). As one can see, for each single dimension 
  
Page 26 of 32 
  
considered, the diagrammes present which the policy priority are if a policy action has 
to be taken to improve the overall performance of the region. 
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Figure 2 Radar Diagrams for the Basque Country Sustainability Benchmarking 
 
 
However one should not forget that an important limitation of composite indicators is 
that they are static in nature. The fact that a country is in a top position in a well-being 
ranking does not of course imply that this situation will last along time. In fact, when the 
same process is considered at different temporal scales, the co-existence of opposite 
causal links may emerge. This is the reason why in a benchmarking exercise, it is 
essential to look at possible relationships between the composite ranking and some 
key drivers that might be some components of the composite framework or other 
complex measures or composites. To give an illustrative example, let us look again at 
  
Page 27 of 32 
  
the KEI composite (Saisana and Munda, 2008). We may ask: is a knowledge based 
economy a good driver for reducing unemployment? For answering this question the 
time scale is the key point. In fact  job creation could be successfully increased in the 
short term, by a slowdown of the rate of technological progress. As noted by the Kok 
report4, this is exactly what has recently happened inside the European Union. But in a 
longer time horizon, this strategy may easily cause the collapse of the economy given 
that non-specialized low productivity jobs can easily be substituted by lower wage 
labour in other parts of the world. Thus, in the short term technological progress and 
job creation are conflicting objectives but they might be compatible in the long run; this 
statement can be corroborated by looking at the relationship between long term 
unemployment rate and the KEI median ranking (see Figure 3). All top countries in the 
KEI measure are presenting an extremely low long term unemployment rate.  
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Figure 3 Relationship between the KEI median ranking and long term unemployment 
rate 
                                                
4Kok W. (2004,) - The High Level Group on Lisbon Strategy (chaired by Wim Kok) (2004) – Facing the Challenge, 
European Communities, Luxembourg.  
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5. Conclusions 
According to the arguments presented here, the following conclusions can be drawn: 
1. Sustainability and well-being research agendas are connected obviously; one 
should note that the classical definition of sustainability given by the World 
Commission on Environment and Development (1987) focused on human 
needs as objective to be sustained over time.  Of course, human needs are 
multidimensional in nature and as a consequence well-being is a more 
adequate comprehensive measure of wealth than traditional GDP. 
2. There is no doubt that there is a lot of complexity and fuzziness inherent in 
multidimensional concepts such as sustainability and well-being.  A possible 
reduction of this complexity, a pre-condition for policy-making, introduces the 
problem of the descriptors used: indicators and indexes. A well-being policy 
exercise implies difficult decisions such as the choice of indicators, their policy 
prioritization and the choice of reference/ideal values; such an exercise is not a 
technical issue only, it is a socio-political issue too. Behind a list of indicators 
and a list of targets there would always be a history of scientific research and 
political controversy. A proper evaluation exercise needs to deal with a plurality 
of legitimate values and interests found in a society. 
3. In a multidimensional framework, multi-criteria evaluation is a very consistent 
approach for the construction of so-called composite indicators. Often, some 
indicators improve while others deteriorate. This is the classical conflictual 
situation dealt with in multi-criteria evaluation; in particular non-compensatory 
methods are quite relevant, since compensability implies complete 
substitutability between different types of capital.  
4. Composite indicators may also present a number of risks, such as 
oversimplification, wrong policy conclusions due to model misspecification, and 
biased results caused by hidden subjective judgments in the design process. 
Uncertainty and sensitivity analysis can help to gauge the robustness of the 
results obtained, to increase the transparency of the ranking system, to identify 
how countries or regions that improve or decline under certain assumptions, 
and to help the framing of the debate around the conceptual framework used, 
i.e. which representation of reality (and thus which societal values and interests) 
has been considered.  
5. In the framework of evidence based policy, benchmarking exercises based on 
real-world reference and ideal points can be very useful. In fact it is possible to 
evaluate how each single country/region is close or far to each single target and 
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thus policy priorities can be established. However one should not forget that an 
important limitation of composite indicators is that they are static in nature. The 
fact that a country is in a top position in a well-being ranking does not of course 
imply that this situation will last over time. In fact, when the same process is 
considered at different temporal scales, the co-existence of opposite causal 
links may emerge. Surely, more research is needed on this topic. The essence 
of the time scale problem is perfectly synthesised by Frank Knight (1921, p. 
313) "... We live in a work of contradiction and paradox, a fact of which perhaps 
the most fundamental illustration is this: that the existence of a problem of 
knowledge depends on the future being different from the past, while the 
possibility of the solution of the problem depends on the future being like the 
past" . 
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